The paper explores the determination of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Balkan transition economies -. Detailed FDI inflows to Southeast Europe (SEE) are analysed to determine the main differences in the volume, timing and sectoral structure of FDI within the region and in comparison to the Central East European countries. A gravity model to all transition economies during 1990-2011 is then estimated to assess whether the factors driving FDI to the Western Balkans are different. They are found to be so; even when size of their economy, distance, institutional quality and prospects of EU membership are taken into account, Western Balkans countries receive less FDI. These issues are of high policy relevance for the Balkan economies and ought to contribute to the current debate on the 'new growth model'.
opportunities and economic potential' (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010, p. 124) . The paper explores whether FDI into the WB region has indeed been even lower than can be explained by economic characteristics of the region, such as smaller size of domestic markets and greater distance from the investing economies -in comparison with other transition economies. Our analysis confirms this view; FDI to the Balkans are driven by geographical and institutional factors, similarly to other transition economies, but there is evidence of a significant negative regional effect. The paper also tries to answer the question of how FDI levels might be affected by prospects of EU membership.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After providing a historical background and brief overview of the literature on FDI in SEE, the key characteristics of FDI inflows to the region are analysed in the third section to determine the cross-country differences in the timing, volume and sectoral structure of FDI, within the SEE region and in comparison to the CEE countries. We go on in the fourth section to test hypotheses about FDI to the Western Balkans empirically on the basis of a gravity model (see ). An attempt is also made to identify the main differences in the impact of FDI on the individual SEE countries. The conclusions in the sixth section point to the main results of policy relevance for the SEE countries that could contribute to the current debate on the 'new growth model', which is particularly important for the less developed Balkan economies. Given the present unfavorable global climate for FDI, exhausted privatization opportunities in most Balkan countries and still unsettled political issues, the return of large amounts of FDI is unlikely in the short run.
2. Historical background and brief overview of the literature Over the past fifteen years there has been a flourishing literature on FDI in Eastern Europe. This is not surprising, since foreign capital has played an important role in most countries during the twenty-year transition to market economy. A number of studies have looked into the key features of FDI in Eastern Europe -its volume, forms, origins, destination by economic activity, and case studies (see, for example, Lankes and Venables, 1996; Meyer, 1998; Estrin, Richet and Brada, 2000; Bartlett, 2008; Kolotai, 2010; Hunya, 2011 Hunya, , 2012 , as well as the determinants of FDI based on econometric research (for example, Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2002; Janicki and Wunnava, 2004; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007) . Despite the growing literature on FDI in transition economies, there has been relatively little research on FDI in the SEE countries.
During the first decade of transition to market economy, FDI in most of the Balkan region was low, most probably deterred by the unstable political environment. Since 1991, a number of political processes and events have had negative economic implications for the whole SEE region (Uvalic, 2003). 3 Political instability in the 1990s has left deep traces on the Balkan region and unresolved political problems remain on the agenda. 4 3 Including the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, five military conflicts during 1991-2001 in practically all the countries of former Yugoslavia (in chronological order Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia/Kosovo, and Macedonia), international sanctions against FR Yugoslavia, the Greek embargo related to the problems of recognition and name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia in 1999 (see Uvalic, 2010) . 4 The most difficult is the issue of Kosovo. Although five years have passed since it declared political independence in February 2008, by late 2012 it has still not been officially recognized by 95 countries or 49.2 percent of UN members, including five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain).
The economic implications of these events have been particularly serious for the countries of former Yugoslavia, all except Slovenia. The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation led to the break-up of traditional economic and trade links, a very deep recession, delays in economic reforms and in integration of most countries with the EU (Uvalic, 2012a) . Bulgaria and Romania also had unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance during much of the 1990s and delayed many fundamental economic reforms. After a marked drop in GDP in the first half of the 1990s, the majority of SEE countries continued to have negative growth rates in the second half of the decade. Economic recovery has generally been slow, so that by 2011 three countries had still not reached their 1989 GDP level (Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina).
Integration with the rest of Europe has also proceeded very unevenly:
Bulgaria and Romania concluded an Association Agreement with the EU in 1993 and became EU member states in 2007, but the other countries were able to deepen their political and economic relations with the EU only after 2000.
These features may account for the fact that, in the mushrooming literature on FDI in transition economies, there has been little research focusing on the SEE region. Demekas et al. (2005) note that SEE is a region not comprehensively covered in econometric studies on FDI in transition economies, in part due to the lack of comparable data. Of the more than 40 empirical studies reviewed in the paper, only four included any SEE countries and even that coverage is patchy and inconsistent (Demekas et al, 2005, p. 4 Kekic (2005) analyses trends in FDI in the Balkans during the early 2000s, concluding that the upsurge in FDI has been based on only a few minimal conditions -the restoration of peace and basic security, the beginnings of economic recovery and modest improvements in the business environment.
Kekic also relates, in a cross-section gravity model, FDI inflows into the 27
East European countries during 1998-2002 to a number of variables that influence FDI including GDP, wages, the business environment, natural resource endowments, privatization and geographic distance. The estimated equation for 1998-2002 explained almost the whole inter-country variation in FDI inflows. The impact of market size, natural resources and labour costs on FDI flows were all statistically significant, but FDI inflows were also found to be sensitive to the policy framework, particularly the business environment and privatization strategy. The further a country is from the EU core, the less FDI it was found to attract. Brada, Kutan and Yigit (2006) examine the effects of transition and of political instability on FDI flows to the transition economies of Central Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans. In their specifications, they relate FDI inflows to a country's economic characteristics. The results show that FDI flows to transition economies unaffected by conflict and political instability exceed those that would be expected for comparable West European countries. In the case of Balkan countries, conflict and instability reduced FDI inflows below what one would expect for comparable West European countries and reform and stabilization failures further reduced FDI to the region. In the case of Albania, the actual inflows of FDI are much greater than predicted by the model specifications. The conclusion is that the economic costs of instability in the Balkans in terms of foregone FDI have been quite high.
Finally, Demekas et al. (2005) analyse the size and distribution of FDI in SEE.
According to their findings, there is evidence that SEE countries lag behind the CEE countries in attracting FDI. Their results show that gravity factors explain a large part of FDI inflows in SEE, but that host-country policies also matter notably relative unit labour costs, the corporate tax burden, infrastructure and the trade regime. The paper develops the concept of potential FDI for each country and uses its deviation from actual level to estimate what policies can realistically be expected to achieve in terms of additional FDI. Particularly for Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the gap between the estimated potential and actual FDI stocks in 2003 was found to be large.
These papers are inconclusive as to whether there is a negative 'Balkans' effect on FDI. Christie (2003) finds FDI in the SEE region to be lower than normal in relation to the CEE countries, but his analysis is incomplete, insofar as it excludes three Balkan countries (as indicated earlier). Brada, Kutan and Yigit (2006) find that conflict, instability and delayed transition have reduced FDI inflows in the Balkans. Demekas et al. (2005) also find actual FDI in most Balkan countries lower than potential. Only Kekic (2005) finds that the determinants of FDI to the Balkans do not differ from those in other transition regions. Moreover, these results are now dated, being based on data which refer to the 1990s and/or the early 2000s. This is why it is important to reexamine these issues taking into account more recent data. There has been a strong upsurge in FDI in most Balkan countries in the 2000s, particularly after 2003, which may have more than compensated for the earlier lack of FDI.
Patterns of FDI inflows in Southeast Europe
Foreign investors arrived later to most SEE than to the CEE countries and the inflow of FDI to this region in the 1990s was low in comparison. Since 2000, most SEE countries have been receiving more FDI, at least until the outbreak of the global economic crisis. Due to the distinct features of these two periods, the patterns of FDI in SEE during the two decades of transition will be considered separately.
Main features of FDI in the 1990s
The SEE region attracted little FDI during the 1990s, probably because of the political risk and economic instability described earlier, as well as competition from more promising transition economies. During the first half of the nineties, a period characterized by major political and economic instability, FDI inflows to SEE were particularly low. By 1996, inward FDI stock in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia (without Bosnia and Herzegovina that in 1992-95 was at war) amounted to only US$ 3.4 billion or 5.7 percent of total inward FDI stock in all 27 transition economies. This is rather less than their share (7.7 percent) in total population of the transition region. The situation improved after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, although many SEE countries continued to lag behind the CEE as FDI recipients. Over the whole 1989-2000 period, the inward FDI stock in the seven SEE countries amounted to around US$ 15.3 billion or 9.4 percent of total inward FDI stock in all 27 transition countries (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. Inward FDI stock, by transition regions (2000)
Source: Authors' elaboration based on UNCTAD data (World Investment Report).
Moreover, the volume of FDI by country (see In 2000, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania accounted for more than 80 percent of the total inward FDI stock in the SEE region (see Figure 3 ; no data are available for Montenegro). Bosnia and Herzegovina received some FDI after the end of the war from 1997 onwards, but its inward FDI stock in 2000 was just over US$ 1 billion. A similar amount went into Serbia, mainly thanks to a major foreign investment deal in 1997, when 51 percent of Telekom Srbija was sold to Greek and Italian partners (Uvalic, 2010) . The other two countries attracted even less. Acceleration in economic reforms also took place, even in countries that until 2000 had been lagging behind (Uvalic, 2010 (Uvalic, , 2012a Kosovo has special treatment (in part due to its non-recognition by some EU member states).
Upsurge of FDI in the 2000s: Political and economic background

Increasing FDI flows in the 2000s
Perhaps as a consequence of the improving political and economic conditions, (2010) Source: Authors' elaboration based on UNCTAD data (World Investment Report).
During the 2000s there have also been some changes in the share of FDI by country (see Figure 5 ). All SEE countries have attracted significantly more FDI with respect to the 1990s, but the increase has been uneven. The major recipient of FDI -Romania -had a tenfold increase in its inward FDI stock As a consequence, intra-regional shares in FDI have not changed substantially since the 1990s (see Figure 6 ). Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia continue to be responsible for the largest part (78 percent) of total inward FDI stock in 2010.
Romania continued to rank first, Bulgaria has now overtaken Croatia, while Serbia has also recently attracted increasing FDI. The uneven increase of FDI into SEE during the past decade can also be observed by comparing inward FDI stock in 2000 and in 2010 by country (see Figure 7 ). 
Annual variations of FDI inflows
FDI by sector of economic activity
The sectoral distribution of FDI has been different across the transition regions. Although this indicator cannot be taken into account in our econometric work, the sectoral distribution of FDI is likely to be important in assessing the longer-term impact of FDI on individual SEE economies, such as its contribution to the promotion of exports or to the generation of new employment (see section 5). FDI by sector of economic activity is reported in Figure 11 for seven SEE countries (comparable data for Montenegro are not presently available). 5 Drawing on the WIIW database that reports FDI stock for individual economic sectors, the data have been aggregated to present inward FDI stock grouped into the primary, manufacturing and services sector of the SEE countries in 2010. 5 Note that for Serbia, only data on the annual FDI inflows from 2005 onwards were available; these have been summed to obtain inward FDI stock for the 2005-10 period. The graph on inward FDI stock in Serbia by sector of activity is therefore not fully comparable to that of the other countries. 
Origins of FDI
Data on inward FDI stock by source country are presented in Table 1 , which shows the top five countries by value of investment in each of the SEE countries. The five major source economies together typically account for more than 50 percent of inward FDI stock. 
Determinants of FDI in the Balkans
The theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) suggests that firms engage in outward FDI when they have some resources that they can transfer and exploit, known in the literature varyingly as firm specific advantages (FSAs) (Rugman, 1982) or ownership (O) advantages (Dunning, 1993) . Only certain types of firms and products are suitable for exploiting these advantages through internalisation (I), namely creating subsidiaries for research, production and distribution in other countries, rather than by exporting or the use of licenses and long term contracts. Finally, the choice of location (L) is driven by firms finding the optimal place where to combine their FSAs with locational advantages to both exploit and explore their FSAs. This framework is known as the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993 , Dunning & Lundan, 2009 ). It argues that firms expand internationally where they can redeploy their internationally-transferable proprietary resources and capabilities to both exploit and explore their resource base. The combination of the FSAs of the firm with the specific conditions found in potential host locations is essential.
In other words, different types of firms are attracted to different locational advantages.
The study of locational determinants of FDI represents a long-established literature that originated with Mundell's (1957) factor endowment theorem (see Brainard, 1997) . The predominant empirical approach to the study of FDI flows is based on gravity models borrowed from international trade research, which posit that the main drivers of trade or foreign investment flows are a) the size of the host economy, b) the size of the source economy, and c) the distance between the two economies (Bloningen, 2005 , Carr et al., 2001 . While these variables have persistently shown to be an important -if not the most important -determinants of the attraction of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001, Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) , recent literature has considerably broadened the notion of locational advantages to encompass the attractiveness of a potential host economy as both a site for production and as a market. Contemporary literature therefore additionally considers:
1. the costs of production, especially unit labour costs (or wage differentials) and locally available intermediate goods ; 2. specifically for investment in the primary sector, the presence of natural resources (Hejazi & Pauli, 2003) ;
3. the institutional framework facilitating or inhibiting the operations of foreign investors, either in an aggregate form, by focusing on specific aspects such as corruption (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) , or by analysing multiple aspects simultaneously , Globerman and Shapiro, 2003 , Grosse and Trevino, 2005 ; 4. membership of international trade and economic associations; for example studying transition economies explored the effects of announcements of likely European Union (EU) membership.
One can also come to a similar estimating framework by considering the four classic motivations for FDI (Dunning, 1993) ; these are market seeking; efficiency seeking; resource seeking; and asset seeking. Market seeking FDI is driven by size and growth of the host economy market; for example the large inflows of FDI to China in recent years have often been argued to be explained in terms of firms seeking new or quickly growing markets for their products. Market seeking investments probably also played an important role in the investment into the transition economies, especially in the early years (Lankes and Venables, 1996; . The size of the economy is
represented in the gravity model by the GDP of the host economy, and this variable is sometime supplemented by the rate of growth of the host economy. The ability to exploit market seeking opportunities is enhanced by scale economies, and these will be greater if the host source economy provides a larger domestic market for investing multinational enterprises which provides a basis for the inclusion of the host economy GDP in the estimating equation. In such a framework, distance reflects the transactions costs of foreign investment and these costs are also positively related to the quality of institutions in the host economy.
Efficiency seeking FDI usually takes the form of investment by firms seeking lower manufacturing costs, for example by relocating production facilities to countries of lower labour cost or outsourcing elements in a firm's value chain to lower cost of suppliers abroad. controlled for this by enhancing the basic gravity model with the inclusion of labour costs in the host economy, and the variable was found to be significant for their panel of transition economies. More generally, efficiency seeking has often been cited as a motivation for investment to Thailand and the Philippines, and for much FDI into transition economies, for example the major investments by German car firms into Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the 1990s (Estrin, Richet, Brada, 2000) . On the other hand, resource seeking is a quite distinct motivation, which leads multinationals in the resource sector to invest in host economies. This is not an important aspect of the Balkans story, but may be relevant across transition economies as a whole; hence we include an indicator of the resources available in the host economy as a control variable in our estimating equation.
Finally, asset seeking FDI is usually considered in terms of tangible or intangible assets, for example patents or brands. This motivation is likely to predominate in FDI between advanced economies, or perhaps in South-North investments, but is not obviously relevant for transition economies, especially the Balkans. However, the privatization process has created a specific asset seeking explanation for FDI in transition (see Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, Svejnar, 2009 There is not an agreed single measure of institutional quality, and the literature notes the problems that arise from collinearity between alternative measures . After some experimentation, we decided to use two measures of institutions, namely investment freedom (invtfreedom) and a quality of property rights protection index (propertyrights), derived from the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. In addition, we take into account FDI opportunities from privatization using the EBRD's large scale privatization index (ti_is_privatisation). We also control for EU membership and follow The correlation coefficients between the independent variables are reported in Table 2 . There are some issues of collinearity among the institutional variables. Thus the institutional quality variables are collinear -countries tend to have good or bad institutions but there is no variation according to the type of institution. The Balkans dummy is correlated with institutional quality, and EU membership with institutional quality and privatization.
Thus there is some evidence that institutional quality drives EU membership rather than the converse. To address these problems, we estimated over the entire sample period (1990-2011) a horse race to explore the effects of collinearity on our results, by adding one or several variables at a time. Selected regressions are reported in Table 3 (results on the key variables of interest are not affected by changes in specifications). Column 1 provides the basic gravity model, which as can be seen describes very well the FDI inflow process. Thus as expected, in logs, FDI is positively and significantly related to the GDP of the host and source economy, and negatively related to their distance apart. Column 2 reports an expanded specification, with wages, resources, and GDP growth, as well as the Balkans and EU dummies. These are all significant with the expected sign (except for GDP growth), and leave unchanged the results concerning the gravity model. In columns 3 and 4 we report the results of adding two institutional variables singly (privatization and property rights), and in column 5 we include a third institutional variable (investment freedom) together with the other two, but exclude the EU dummy. The investment freedom variable is not significant. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We can explore our main hypotheses using this table. As in there is a strong and highly significant EU announcement effect.
Successful policies to carry out large scale privatisation are associated with increased FDI in the transition economy region. Moreover, despite the collinearity we are able to identify positive effects from better institutions on FDI: in column 3 through privatization and in column 4 via property rights.
Columns 3 and 4 therefore represent well specified models of the FDI process, including all of the main variables noted in the literature. This is a demanding specification in which to test whether there is an independent Balkans effect on FDI. We observe in columns 2 to 5 inclusive that the Western Balkan dummy variable is always negative and statistically significant. This indicates that even when the growth of their domestic economies, the relative weakness of institutions, the slow pace of privatization and non-membership of the EU is taken into account, the Western Balkans countries receive less FDI than would be expected on the basis of the size and location of their economies. 
Impact of FDI
Share of FDI in gross fixed capital formation
Throughout the transition region, foreign capital has been an important supplement to domestic savings, and thus has greatly contributed to financial accumulation during the past twenty years. In the transition region the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation has tended to be higher than the world average and has increased over time (Kalotay, 2010: 61-2 
FDI contribution to structural changes
FDI has played an important role in enterprise restructuring in the whole transition region during privatizations, in this way greatly strengthening the private sector and contributing to structural changes. Industrial restructuring usually tended to accelerate when privatization involving FDI was implemented, frequently creating a dichotomy between the modern, foreignowned enterprises and the traditional industries. The dominant view has been that FDI has had positive spill-over effects for the whole economy, though there have also been findings that run counter to such optimistic conclusions (see, for example, Mencinger, 2003) . Kalotay (2010) convincingly argues that the contribution of FDI to structural change in various groups of economies in transition has been very uneven, having created strong structural changes only in the new EU member states but much less in the Balkan countries (p. 73). In the Western Balkans there were substantial delays in privatisation in most countries; privatisation methods during the 1990s were based mainly on sales to privileged insiders; and the composition of FDI in SEE has often not favoured industrial restructuring, since the dominant part, as reported earlier, has gone into services rather than into key manufacturing sectors. Due to such a structure of FDI, the Balkan countries have not been successful in integrating into global supply chains (Handjiski et al. 2010, p. 16) . Although various services can clearly be involved in supply chains and can be quite important for a country's exports (the most well-known example is India), their share in overall exports of most Balkan countries, for the moment, is fairly low.
FDI contribution to exports
The composition of FDI also adds to our understanding why SEE counries foreign trade performance has not been more satisfactory, particularly of the Western Balkans. Although WB countries' exports have been increasing steadily, both intra-and extra-regional exports remain below potential (Handjiski et al. 2010, p. xv) . During the past two decades the structure of exports of most WB countries has changed only marginally. Given that most SEE countries have attracted a large part of FDI primarily in non-tradable services, FDI has not contributed much to promoting exports or to industrial diversification and upgrading. The manufacturing industry, as the key sector for developing export potential, has actually continued to decline in most SEE countries also during the past decade, after the very strong process of deindustrialization in the 1990s which has been more extreme than in CEE.
One of the consequences is that the SEE countries are less integrated into the global economy than the CEE or Baltic states, as measured by the standard indicator of a country's integration or openness -the exports of goods and services/GDP ratio (see Figure 15 ). The average export/GDP ratio in the SEE countries in 2008 was still fairly low (37 percent) as compared to the average ratio for the CEE and the Baltics (66 percent) (see Uvalic, 2012b) . Bartlett and Uvalic eds, 2013) . The sectoral structure of FDI probably again explains why foreign investors have not contributed more to employment creation, since traditional labor-intensive sectors have not been among the most preferred. It has been argued for Serbia that the tax system has also been a deterrent to major FDI in labour-intensive industries (Arandarenko, 2009; Uvalic, 2010) .
The regressive labour tax system introduced in 2001 has favored investment in sectors with above-average wages and disfavored those involving belowaverage wages, which has further reduced the chances for successful restructuring within labour-intensive sectors such as the textile and foodprocessing industries (Arandarenko, 2009 ). The Kragujevac area in Serbia seems to have seen a decline in unemployment with the arrival of the large FIAT investment, but on the aggregate level the unemployment rate in 2011 has further increased.
Conclusions and policy implications
How much government policies can help in attracting FDI is raised by Demekas et al. (2005) privatization opportunities in most Balkan countries and still unsettled political issues, the return of large amounts of FDI is unlikely in the short run.
Our findings confirm that for the Western Balkans, both groups of factors are important. Their location is relatively more distant from the major foreign investors than the transition economies of Central Europe, but our empirical analysis shows that the institutional environment has also had a critical role to play. The Balkan countries have failed to improve their institutions, for example regarding the protection of property rights or the investment climate, to levels attained by other more advanced economies, and our estimates suggest that this has cost the countries dear in terms of FDI foregone. FDI to the Balkan countries could therefore be further increased by government policies, but this would imply grasping the nettle of deep rooted institutional reform.
We find that the levels of FDI to the Balkan economies can be explained by three categories of factors. The first is the size of the domestic economy; apart from Romania, these economies are relatively small and GDP of the host economy has a significant positive effect on FDI. Secondly, their distance from the investing economies of Western Europe, and their remoteness from the EU and other major trading blocs, summarized in our framework by the distance variable, which is always negative and significant in our equations.
The third category of factors relates to institutional quality, though this is harder to interpret because of collinearity between the various measures.
Taken together, the results suggest that a variety of institutional factors are the third significant determinant of FDI into transition economies; in general there is more FDI into countries where institutions are more market supporting. Institutional quality is closely related to EU membership -it is the countries which score more highly in terms of these indicators of institutional quality which are members of the EU, though it is not clear in which direction the causality runs. Thus, the process of joining the EU leads countries to improve their institutional quality. On the other hand, the EU tends to admit as members countries which are further advanced in terms of developing their institutions. Thus we find that announcement of EU membership also leads to higher levels of FDI, but it is not clear whether this effect is independent from the institutional quality effect.
Even taking all these factors into account, our regressions (columns 2 to 5) confirm the view that there is a negative 'Western Balkans' effect on FDI. We observe in Table 3 that the dummy variable for the Western Balkans is always statistically significant, independently of whether the EU dummy is included or not. Thus being in the Western Balkans exercises an independent negative effect on FDI in a fully specified extended gravity equation. This seems to indicate that the unfortunate recent political history of the region, with conflicts, fragmentation and low growth, have exercised a long lasting and independent effect on their prospects for receipt of FDI. The political risk, deriving from various unsettled political issues in the region, still seems to exercise a negative effect on FDI.
Our empirical work establishes a positive correlation between announcement of EU membership and FDI. It is not clear whether this is because EU membership raises FDI per se, via reduced transactions costs and risk, because EU membership leads countries to improve their institutions, or because the EU only admits countries which already have superior institutions to membership. To the extent that the former phenomena are effective, it is clearly in the interest of Western Balkans countries seeking to increase their FDI in order to accelerate restructuring and reduce unemployment to strive towards EU membership. To the extent that EU membership is associated with superior institutions, the two policy recommendations of this paper are therefore mutually supportive.
